






An investor who purchases foreign securities
exposes himself to a variety ofrisks. For exam-
ple, unanticipated movements in exchange rates
may adversely affect the returns on his invest-
ment. Or the sudden imposition of exchange
controls may prevent the repatriation ofinterest
and dividends. There is also the possibility that
interest rates mayrise, causinga capitalloss ifthe
security has to be sold prior to maturity. (This
type of risk is common to domestic securities as
well.) And, of course, a borrower~whether a
corporation or a country~may default.
This article analyzes the role which two of
these categories of risk~unanticipatedmove-
ments in exchange rates and in interest rates~
play in the determination of yield spreads be-
tween countries. An understanding ofthis issue
helps to explain why internationalyield differen-
tials may be poor guides to the market's beliefs
about future exchange-rate movements. Fur-
thermore, the article shows how the interaction
of exchange-rate risk and interest-rate risk may
at times make foreign assets appear less risky to
an investor than domestic ones.
The fact that foreign assets are not necessarily
more risky has also been emphasized by Donald
Heckerman. 1 He reaches that conclusion
through a consideration ofthe risk ofchanges in
the terms-of-trade to an individual whose con-
sumption is heavily weighted towards imports.
For example, the treasurer of a multinational
corporation may find foreign assets the better
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hedge against inflation in countries where his
firm purchases raw materials. This way oflook-
ing at exchange risk is analogous to the "pre-
ferred habitat" theory of the domestic term
structure~in which some investors view long
bonds as less risky than short ones2~andserves
as a useful complementtothe view adopted here.
Since the concept of risk is central to this
article, Section I examinesjust what is meant by
the term. It introduces the notion of"risk aver-
sion" in the simple case in which the only risk is
that ofunanticipated exchange-ratemovements.
Section II then proceeds to the case.in which
interest-rate risk is present as well. Itdiscusses in
qualitative terms what patterns ofinternational
yield relationships might obtain if investors are
assumed to be averse to risk. Section III presents
a formal model ofthe effect ofrisk aversion on
international yield spreads. The model is used to
derive an expression relatinginterest rates in two
countries to (a) the expected change in the
exchange rate between the currencies ofthe two
countries and (b) an adjustment for risk. The
latter term is seen to be a simple international
analogue ofthe measure ofrisk developed in the
literature on domestic securities markets.3 This
section is moretechnicalthanthe othersandmay
be skipped by those readers not interested in the
mathematical formulation of the argument.
Section IV tests themodelagainsttheevidence
provided by the pattern ofinterest rate differen-
tials between government bonds in Canada and
the U.S. in the period from mid-1971 through
1975. The data appear to support the hypothesis
that these yield differences can be partly ex-
plained as adjustmentsfor risk. SectionVbriefly
summarizes the principal conclusions and their
implications.I. The Nature of Exchange Risk
Perhaps the easiest way to approach the prob-
lem of risk in general and of exchange risk in
particular is to consider the choice faced by an
individual as he decides whether to purchase a
domestic bond or a foreign bond. To keep the
example simple, it will be assumed that both
bondsmaturein one year, and thatthe individual
intends to hold whichever one he purchases until
maturity. These assumptions imply that the
investor knows for certain the nominal returns
on both bonds.4 He must then ask himself: What
are the chances that any difference in the nomi-
nal yields will be more than offset by changes in
the exchange rate?
He knows, of course, the current (spot) ex-
change rate at which he could purchase the
currency needed to buy the foreign bond. What
he does not know is what the spot exchange rate
will be a year in the future.5 However, he no
doubt has some beliefs about the likelihood of
alternative values of the exchange-rate obtain-
ing. It is convenient to think of these views as
constituting a "subjective probability distribu-
tion;" i.e., with each possible future value ofthe
exchange rate, the investor associates a number
representing the probability that that ratewill be
the actual one. The expected value ofthe distri-
bution then representshis "bestguess" as to what
rate will prevail in a year.
To make this example more concrete, imagine
that a V.S. investor could get a 7-percent return
ona domestic bond and 9percent ona Canadian
bond of comparable quality. If he expects the
Canadian dollar to depreciate vis-a-vis the V.S.
dollar by less than 1.835 percent at the very
worst, his expected net gain would be greater on
the Canadian bond than on the American one.
To see why, suppose that the current spot ex-
change rate were unity. Then a U.S. investor
could convert $100 into C$100, buy a Canadian
bond, and have C$109 at the end ofa year. Ifthe
Canadian dollar had depreciated by 1.835 per-
cent in the interim, each Canadian dollar would
than exchange for only $0.98165. The investor's
C$109 would be worth just $107, the amount
which he could have obtained by purchasing the
V.S. security instead.
In general, if F is the current spot exchange
rate (expressed as the U.S. dollar price ofa unit
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offoreign currency), E(F) the expected value of
the future spotrate, Rthedomesticyield, and R*
the foreign yield, then the U.S. investor will
expect a net gain from choosing the foreign
security whenever
I + R < (E(F)jF) . (1 + R*). (1)
The left-hand side of expression (1) represents
the value in one year ofa V.S. dollar invested in
the U.S. security. The right-hand side shows the
value in one year ofa U.S. dollar which was first
converted into (1 j F) units of foreign currency
and then invested in the foreign security, the
proceeds from which investment were then con-
verted back to U.S. dollars atthe expected future
spot exchange rate, E(F). Itshould be noted that
if the foreign currency were expected to appre-
ciate, then E(F)> F, and it would be possibleto
have R*less than R and yet for the U.S. investor
to still expect a net gain from buying the foreign
security as opposed to the domestic one.
Of course, the investor's expectations about
the exchange rate might turn outto be wrong.lf,
in the aboveexample, he had boughtthe Canadi-
an bond on the basis of an expected I-percent
depreciation ofthe Canadian dollarand it had in
fact depreciated by 3 percent, his net return on
the foreign investment would be less than the
amount which he could have earned domestical-
ly. Economists reserve the term "exchange risk"
for the possibility of such deviations from ex-
pected movements in the value of a currency.
Some individuals may be willingtomaketheir
investment decisions on the basis of expected
returns alone, without regard for the risk of
unfulfilled expectations. Such individuals are
said to be "risk-neutral."In theaboveexample,a
risk-neutral investor would optfor the Canadian
bond as long as his expectation of the rate of
depreciation of the Canadian dollar were less
than 1.835 percent. Other individuals, while also
expecting a depreciation ofunder 1.835 percent,
might only buy the Canadian bond if its return
were higher than 9percent. These individuals are
said to be "risk-averse."
In a world dominated by risk-neutral inves-
tors, equilibrium in international bond markets
would require that yield differentials in favor of
any country be exactly offset by an expecteddepreciation of that country's currency. Any
other configuration of interest rates and ex-
change rates (both actual and expected) would
leave at least someinvestors withinducementsto
change the composition oftheir portfolios. For
consideragaintheaboveexample,in which there
exists a 2-percent yield differential in favor of
Canada. If the expected depreciation of the
Canadian dollar were less than 1.835 percent,
risk-neutral American investors would have an
incentive to sell theirholdings ofU.S. bondsand
to buy Canadian bonds. These actions would
tend to raise U.S. yieldsandtodepress Canadian
ones, thereby reducingthedifferential infavorof
Canada. Canadian investors would similarly
switch from U.S. to Canadian bonds. This proc-
ess would continue until the yield spread just
offset the expected rate of depreciation of the
Canadian dollar, i.e., until6
I + R =(E(F)/F)· (I + R*). (2)
Could a different equilibrium relationship
hold in a world of risk-averse investors? In this
simple example in which there is no interest-rate
risk, the answer is "Yes" only when one of the
countries is a net international debtor. In that
case, the yield onthe bonds ofthe debtor nation
will have to incorporatea risk premium in order
to induce investors in the creditor nation to hold
such bonds.
In order to see why, recall that a risk-averse
investor, by definition, is contenttogive upsome
expected yield as the necessary price ofreducing
his exposure to risk. Thus, a U.S. investor, for
example, faced with a yield spread in favor of
Canada which exceeds the expected rate of
depreciation of the Canadian dollar, might not
feel any incentive to switch from U.S. securities
to Canadian ones. But although there might not
beanymarket forces emanatingfrom the U.S. to
drive the yield differential back into conformity
with (2), the actions ofCanadianinvestors might
achievethesameresults. Forin theireyes, itis the
U.S. bonds only which are risky. Given the
circumstances just described, a Canadian inves-
tor could get a certain return on his own coun-
try's security which exceeds the expected return
on the U.S. security. Clearly, he would have an
incentive to sell his U.S. bonds and buy Canadi-
an ones, whether he were risk-neutral or risk-
averse. Once again, yield spreads would move
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back toward the relationship given in (2).
However, if Canada were a net international
debtor, the movement would not be complete.
For then Canadian holdings of U.S. bonds
would be less than U.S. holdings of Canadian
bonds. As Canadiansproceeded toswitchtotheir
own bonds, a situation would be reached in
which Canadians held only the obligations of
their owncountry while some U.S. investorsstili
held Canadian securities. Again, the risk-averse
U.S. investors would only be willing to hold the
Canadianbondsifthe premiumattachedto them
intheformofa higheryield exceeded theamount
necessary tojust offsettheexpecteddepreciation
ofthe Canadian dollar. But now there would be
no further possibility ofriskless arbitrage on the
part of the Canadians. In order to take advan-
tage oftheinternationalyield spread, theywould
have to borrow U.S. dollars to buymoreCanadi-
an bonds. If they, too, were risk-averse, they
would not expose themselves to an uncovered
U.S.-dollar liability unless the gain from doing
so, i.e., the yield spread, were greater than the
expected appreciation of the U.S. dollar. In
otherwords, it would be possibleforthe Canadi-
ans aswell asfortheAmericansto be inequilibri-
um with the interest rate differential between the
two countries larger than that given by (2).
Several observations should be made regard-
ing this conclusion. Ifit were only toholdforthe
caseinwhich investors in onecountryspecialized
completely in their own bonds, it would not be
very interesting. However, the same conclusion
holds for the more general case-in which inves-
tors in both countries hold internationallydiver-
sified portfolios-once the menu of available
assets is expanded to include bonds which are
subject to interest-rate risk as well as exchange-
rate risk. Moreover, nothing in the discussion so
far limits the applicability of these results to a
world of floating exchange rates. Even if ex-
change rates were officiaUy "pegged," as under
the Bretton Woods system, investors would
reasonably attach positive probabilities to the
prospect of different rates obtaining in the fu-
ture. Finally, since there is ample evidence from
the domestic term-structure literaturethatinves-
tors tend to be risk-averse,7 it seems worthwhile
to pursue further the implications of risk aver-
sion for international yield spreads. That is the
subject of the next two sections.II. International Yield Spreads in a
Risk-Averse World
In order to highlight the concept ofexchange
risk, the onlyinvestmentchoiceconsidered so far
has been thechoice betweenadomesticbondand
a foreign bond whose nominal returns in their
respective currencies are kno",'n with certainty.
In the real world, ofcourse, the typical investor
can also hold domestic assets whose nominal
returns are uncertain. For example, one might
purchase a long-term bond with the knowledge
that it might have to be sold prior to maturity.
Once the range of asset choice is extended to
include in each country a domestic bond subject
to interest-rate risk, the question of how risk
affects international yield spreadsbecomes more
complex.
Each investor can hold one asset which is free
from both interest-rate and exchange-rate risk.
For simplicity, this asset may be thought ofas a
short-term bond issued by the governmentofthe
investor's own country. He may also hold one
asset subject only to interest-rate risk, which will
be considered here as a long-term bond of his
own government. A third asset-the foreign
government short-term bond-is subject only to
exchange risk, andafourth-theforeign govern-
ment long-termbond-issubject to bothtypes of
risk. One safe and three risky assetsare therefore
available to all investors, but the risk attributes
of any given asset depend on the nationality of
the investor appraising it.
The decision faced by a risk-averse investor
who must allocate his funds among one safe and
several riskyassets has beenextensivelyanalyzed
in terms of the portfolio-balance theory pio-
neered by Markowitz8 and Tobin.9 That theory
focuses on theway in whichaninvestor, through
diversification, can reduce the fluctuations in the
earnings of his portfolio as a whole. In other
words, "Don't put all your eggs in one basket."
Inorderfordiversification to have this benefit,
it is necessary that the returns on the various
assets held be less thanperfectlycorrelated.Ifthe
returns ondifferentassets move together, thereis
no advantage to diversification. However, ifthe
returns on one asset tend to be high when those
on another are low, and vice versa, the earnings
ofa portfolioconsistingofboth ofthem will have
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less variability than will the earnings ofeither of
them individually. Therefore, when an investor
assesses the value of a potential addition to his
portfolio, he places particular attention on the
covariance between the returns on the new asset
and the returns on those which he already holds.
The lower that covariance, the greater is the
reduction in risk gained from purchasingthenew
asset. It follows that even a risk-averse investor
will generally find it to his advantage to include
in his portfolio some assets which, when viewed
individually, appear very risky.
Herbert Grubel has extended these ideas toan
international setting. 10 He points out that diver-
sification into foreign assets can also reduce the
overall risk (i.e., variability of earnings) of a
portfolio even though it involves purchasing
assets subject to exchange risk. Of course, the
investor must now "translate" the returns on the
foreign assets into his own currency. Even so, if
business cycles are out of phase in different
countries, a portfolio consisting of assets of
several countries might generate more stable
earnings than a portfolio consisting only of
domestic assets.
Grubel is primarily interested in showing the
potential welfare gains from international diver-
sification and in explaining observed patterns of
capital flows. However, it is possible to use his
idea ofinternationalportfolio balanceto see how
yield spreads between countries in a risk-averse
world could be different from those under risk-
neutrality. Consider again a situation in which
the yield spread-in this case, on long bonds-in
favor ofCanada more than compensated for an
expected depreciationofthe Canadiandollar. As
before, it is clear that such a situation could
represent an equilibrium position fromthepoint
of view of U.S. investors. But, once more, the
question arises whether it could represent an
equilibrium from thepointofview ofCanadians.
Would not Canadians have an incentive to sell
their U.S. long bonds and to buy Canadian long
bonds untilthe spread were equalto theexpected
change in the exchange rate?
Not necessarily, because the Canadian long
bond is not a riskless asset from a Canadianperspective. Although it is free from exchange
risk, it is still subject to interest-rate risk. Thereis
no reason to presume apriorithat it is less risky
(to the Canadians) than the U.S. long bond. Hit
is not, risk-averse Canadian investors, like their
U.S. counterparts, would be willing to hold U.S.
long bonds despite the higher expected yield on
the Canadian securities.
There is a fundamental difference, then, be-
tween the example considered in Section I, in
which the only risk was exchange risk, and that
considered here, in which interest-rate risk is
present as well. Investors in eithercountrymight
find the combined risks on the foreign long-term
bond to be less than the interest-rate risk on the
domestic long bond. In that situation, they
woulddemanda premium on theirdomesticlong
bond rather than on the foreign long bond.
To recapitulate, once account is taken ofboth
kinds of risk, it is possible to explain how
international yield spreads under risk aversion
can differ from those under risk neutrality with-
out any appeal to the net debtor status of a
particular country. However, it would be desir-
able to be moreprecise thanthat. In particular, it
would be desirable to develop a relationship
equivalent to equation (2) for the case of risk-
averse investors. To do so, it is necessary to
develop a formal model of international bond
markets.
III. A Model of International Bond Markets
In recent years, several authors have devel-
oped elaborate models ofinternationalsecurities
markets. I I However, the flavor of their results
can be adequately captured by a much simpler
model which we have developed based on the
work of Michael Porter.I2 Porter considers the
case of a country whose international lendings
and borrowings'are too smallto have anyimpact
on the level of yields prevailing in the world
capital market. The yields in the world market
are taken as given and are not explained within
the model. What the model explains are the
spreads-positive or negative-between those
yields and the ones in the "small" country.
This model will be the starting point for the
empirical work in Section IV, in which Canada
will be viewed as a small countryand the U.S. as
the world market. In 1976, the total value ofnew
Canadian bond issues sold abroad by all
entities-corporate and government-
amounted to less than three percent ofnet funds
raised in the U.S. Moreover, 1976 was a year of
unusually heavy borrowing by Canadians. Dur-
ing the first half of the 1970's, Canadian bond
issues sold abroad typically amounted to only
about one percent of net funds raised in the
U.S.I3 Therefore, the simplifying assumption of
the model-that the small country does not have
an appreciable effect on yields in the world
market-appears to be a reasonable one in the
context of this study.
As in the previous discussion, investors are
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assumed to have four assets to choose from:
short and long bonds issued by both the small
country and the "rest-of-the-world" (which will
be referred to as Canada and the U.S., respec-
tively). The stock of bonds outstanding is taken
as exogenous. Each investor knows with certain-
ty the spot exchange rate and the one-period
nominal yields on both short securities; i.e., the
"period" ofthe analysis just matches the maturi-
ty ofthe shorts. He does notknowforcertain the
value of the exchange rate at the end of the
period nor the one-period nominal yields on the
longs, buthis subjectiveprobabilitydistributions
for these variables can be completely summa-
rized by their means and variances. With that
information, he sets out to allocate his funds
among the available assets so as to maximize the
expected utility of his end-of-period wealth,
expressed in terms of his domestic currency. 14
The maximization problem is straightfor-
ward, and the details are set forth in a technical
appendix which is available upon request. The
resulting conditions for a maximum can be
simplified in thecase ofthe average U.S. investor
by recognizing that, in equilibrium, Canadian
bonds mustaccountfor onlya negligiblefraction
ofthe value ofhis portfolio. Otherwise, Canadi-
an lending and borrowingdecisions would influ-
ence U.S. yields, in violationofthe smallcountry
assumption. Ifthe shares of Canadian bonds in
the typical U.S. portfolio are actually set at zero
as an approximation to the condition for anexpected-utility maximum for U.S. investors.' it
is possible to derive expressions for CanadIan
yields. .
The result which is of most interest here IS:
'" '" [E(RL) - R S] .A
E[(l +R* ) (l +dF)]=I +RS+ '"
L var(RL)
where A =cov[(l +Ie ), (l + R! )(I +dF)].
- ~. L (3)
Rs is the known one-period yield on the U.S.
short, and R L the one-period yield on the U.S.
long. Since R L is a random variableat the start
of the period, it is written with a tilde. RS and
Rt are thecorrespondingCanadianyields. The
symbol LlF stands for the percentage chan~e in
the spot exchange rate during the next penod.
Equation (3) relates thetotalexpected yield ~n
the Canadian long, adjusted for any change III
the exchange rate, to the yield on the U.S. short,
plus a term which may be thought ofas cons~itu~­
ing a risk premium. The reasonfor interpretmgIt
as a risk premium is simple: were it to be zero,
equation (3) would reduce to (2), the equilibrium
condition under risk neutrality.
Since (3) was derived solely from the condi-
tions for a maximum for U.S. investors, the
small-country assumption might seem to imply
that Canadian yields are determined in the U.S.
However, it would be incorrect to make that
inference. For(3) is merelyastatementaboutthe
expected product ofthe Canadianlongyield and
the rate of change in the exchange rate. It says
nothing about the determination of either ~f
those magnitudes individually. For example, It
does not rule out the possibility that Canada
could arbitrarily peg the yield on its long bonds.
But equation (3) does say that such an acti~n
would determine the expected rate ofchange III
the exchange rate, given values for the yield on
the U.S. short and for the risk premium. I5
The risk premium term will look familiar to
anyone acquainted with the work done on do-
mestic financial markets by Lintner and
Sharpe. I6 Their "capital asset pricing model"
indicates that the expected yield on a risky asset
will, in equilibrium, equal the yield on the safe
asset plus a premium of the form:
[E(RM) - RS]' cov (Rj, RM)
var (RM)
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where the subscript j refers to the risky asset in
question, S to the safe asset, and M to a market
basket of risky assets. In the risk premium term
in (3), Rj is replaced by the total return to a U.S.
investor on the risky foreign long. In place of
RM there appears R L, which is the domestic
market basket in this simplified model.
There are intuitive explanations for the pres-
ence of the various components of the risk
premium in (3). The higher the expected yield on
the U.S. long relative to the yield on the safe
asset-the U.S. short-the higher must be the
total return expected on the Canadian ·long
before a risk-averse U.S. investor will purchase
it. Thus, [E(RL) - RS] enters the premium term
with a positive sign. The greater the covariance
between the yields on the U.S. long and on the
Canadian long (adju;sted for expected exchange
rate changes), the smaller are the gains from
diversification provided by the latter. Again, the
total return ofthe Canadian long must be higher
to compensate, so A enters positively. Its total
vield must similarlv be higher, the smaller the
~ariance ofthe retu~n on the U.S. long, for then
the risk of a capital loss on the U.S. long is
smaller. The variance of R L therefore enters
negatively.
The preceding discussion looked at the com-
ponents of the risk premium from the point of
view ofa U.S. investor, who would demand such
a premium as a condition for holding Canadian
bonds. But, as was argued in Section II, a risk-
averse Canadian investor would generally not
want to sell all of his U.S. longs in order to buy
Canadian longs whenever the yield on the latter
was higher than the level consistent with equa-
tion (2). Both longs are risky assets to him, and
the relative desirability ofeach would depend on
the same kind of factors which entered the
calculations of the U.S. investor.
The fact that the concerns ofinvestors in both
countries are really quite similar suggests that, a
priori, one should not expecta positive premium
to be always included in the yield on the long
bond of the small country. U.S. investors could
reasonably decide that the combined exchange-
rate risk and interest-rate risk of the Canadian
security is less than the interest-rate risk of the
U.S. long. In fact, the "premium" in equation(3)
could clearly be negative as well as positive, forthe two terms in the numeratorcould individual-
ly be ofeithersign. Itis really betterthoughtofas
an "adjustment" for risk. But the word "premi-
um" is well-established and will be maintained
here, with the understanding that it need not be
positive.
The incorporation ofrisk premiums (positive
or negative) into the yields of internationally
traded assets cancreateafundamental difference
in the interpretation of international yield
spreads, depending on the risk characteristics of
investors. In a risk-neutral world, the foreign
yield could exceed the domestic one only when
the foreign currency was expected to depreciate.
In the case of risk-aversion, no such inference
about expected exchange-rate changes can be
made from an observation ofyield differentials
alone. A yield differential in favor of a foreign
country would be compatible with an expected
appreciation of the foreign currency, provided
that the risk premium associated with thatcoun-
try's bonds were great enough. The likelihood of
such an occurrence depends on the quantitative
significance of the risk premiums, which is the
subject of the next section.
IV. Empirical Tests of the Model
In real-world financial markets, of course,
there are many factors influencing interest-rate
spreads other than expectations of exchange-
rate movements and adjustments for interest-
rate and exchange-rate risk. Differences among
national tax systems and government controls
oncapitalflows are two which come immediately
to mind. Some ofthese problems are avoided in
the present case by choosing Canada and the
U.S. for the empirical part ofthis study. Obser-
vation ofmodel relationships is facilitated by the
high degree ofintegration ofthe U.S. and Cana-
dian capital markets, and by the relativeabsence
of official interference in financial transactions
between the two countries. Also, by limiting
observations to yields ongovernment bonds, we
avoid distortions caused by default risk. Because
of difficulties in obtaining comparably-defined
data series for the two countries, yields on bonds
maturing in three-to-five years were used for
their long-term interest rates. The market yield
on three-month Treasury bills was used for the
U.S. short rate. l ?
The period analyzed was from June 1971
throughDecember 1975, duringall ofwhich time
the Canadian dollar was allowed to float. Cana-
da had actually dropped its fixed exchange rate
in mid-1970, but, as is explained below, a year's
worth ofobservations was used up in the forma-
tion of a proxy for the risk premium. It would
have been desirable to have included a period of
fixed exchange rates in the study, to determine
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whether the effect of exchange risk on interest-
rate differentials had in fact differed under the
two regimes. Conceptually, the model outlined
in the technical appendix is applicable to both
fixed andflexible rates. However, theproblemof
finding adequate proxies for expectations and
risk underfixed rates has so far prevented its use
outside of a period of flexible rates.
The behavior ofyield spreads between the two
countries, under both types of exchange-rate
systems, is summarized in Table Iand in Chart I.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Canadian-U.S.
Yield Differentials on 3-5-Year Bonds
2 3 4
Correlation
U.S. Canadian Yield Spread, Coefficient




Mean 4.862 5.609 0.747 0.957





Mean 6.900 7.048 0.148 0.904
Standard 0.889 l.lOO 0.490
deviationPerhaps the most obvious relationship is the
close parallel movement ofyields on Canadian
and U.S. medium-term bonds under both types
of exchange-rate regimes. The correlation is
higher for the fixed-rate period than for the
period offloat, but not strikingly so.
The comparison also shows that the average
spread in the 1960's exceeded thatoftheflexible-
rate period of the 1970's. This pattern of yield
spreadsdoes notaccord withthe simpleview that
foreign lendingis riskier underflexible ratesthan
underfixed rates, and that U.S. lenders, who are
assumed to determine the spread, therefore de-
mand higher yields tocompensateforthe greater
risk resulting from flexible rates. The fact that
average spreads were positive during the fixed-
rate period also casts doubtsonthe model ofrisk
neutrality, since, "with the exception of brief
periods when U.S. balance of payments pro-
grams were applied to Canada, the predominant
pressures on the Canadian dollar [from 1962 to
1970] were up, not down."18 Given the expecta-
tion ofa revalued Canadian dollar, the model of
risk neutrality would predict lower, not higher,
Canadian yields in relation to U.S. yields.
These observations suggest the importance of
risk premiums in Canadian-U.S. interest differ-
entials, but econometrictests are necessary tosee
whether those premiums are really statistically
significant. Consider again the basic model,
which is rewritten here with the left-hand side
expanded:
[1 +E(RV] [1 +E(D.F)] +cov(R:t ,~F)= 1+R S
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28Before onecanruna regressiononthatequation,
the unobservable expectation and risk variables
have to be replaced with observable magnitudes.
For the expected yields on the long bonds, we
made the usual assumption that expected yields
equal current-market yields.J9 For the compo-
nents ofthe risk premium, we proxied the unob-
served variances and co-variances with twelve-
month moving sample variances and
covariances. This procedure is also a standard
one, althoughthechoiceoftwelve monthsfor the
size of the sample was somewhat arbitrary.2o
It was also necessary to find a suitable proxy
for exchange-rate expectations-a crucial prob-
lem, since the use ofan inadequate expectations
proxy could seriously bias the tests for the
significance of the risk premium. Rather than
trying to find "the"correct proxy, we decided to
run regressions with two different expectations
variables in order to gauge the strength of any
results involving the risk premium.
Under the first alternative, we assumed that
investors expect no change in the exchange rate.
They may have a wide varianceconcerning their
expectations, but their "best guess" is that the
rate will be the same in the future as now.21
Under the second alternative, we assumed that
investors expect some "normal" level of the
exchange rate to prevail in the long-run. When-
ever the currentratedeviatesfrom this level, they
expect that future rates will move backto it. This
assumption is supported by the fact that the
Canadian-U.S. exchange rate could statistically
be described as "stationary" during the sample
period, showing a tendencytofluctuate around a
mean level of$1.003.22 Thisvalue was used as the
expected future spot rate in the second set of
estimations.
The tests of the model were based on regres-
sions of the form:
[1 + E(Rt)] [1 + E(LlF)] + cov(Rt, LlF)-
(l + RS) = a + b . (Risk Premium) + u.
The left-hand variable is the amount by which
the expected total return on a Canadian bond to
a U.S. investor exceeds the return on the U.S.
safeasset. The model would predict a coefficient
on the risk premium of +1. However, since the
model itself was based on highly restrictive
assumptions, and since a proxywas used for the
29
premium, the only presumption we could make
about this coefficient was that it should be
positive and significant. Similarly, although no
constant term appears in the theoretical equa-
tion, one was included in the regressions to pick
up those effects not covered by the model, such
as differential tax policies in the two countries.
For the expectations assumption of no
exchange-rate change, the results of a least-
squares estimation were:
Constant 0.0034 (2.9)
Risk Premium 0.57 (9.1)
R2 0.61
D.W.0.44
(Note: Numbers in parenthesesaret-statistics.)
Although the t-statistics are quite large, the
very low Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that
the t-values may be biased upwards. The low
D.W. value indicates eitherpositiveautocorrela-
tion in the error-term of the equation or the
inclusion of a distributed lag in the correct
specification of the equation. On the basis of a
test suggested by Griliches, it wasconcludedthat
autocorrelation was the better explanation.23
Accordingly, the equation was re-estimated us-
ing the Cochrane-Orcutt correction for auto-
correlation. The results were:
Constant 0.0051 (1.5)




Therisk premiumappeared to be highlysignif-
icant and had the correctsign. But, ofcourse, the
validity ofany inferences based on the equation
are conditional on the assumption that
exchange-rate expectations are adequately cap-
tured by the proxy used for them. It was there-
fore important to see how robust these results
would be under an alternative expectations as-
sumption.
When the equation was re-estimated with the
second expectations proxy-the exchange rate
reverting to its mean-the Durbin-Watson sta-
tistic was againverylow,0.21. Applicationofthe
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure did not cure the
problem. After some experimentation with al-
ternative distributed lags, it was found that thebest specification was a simple Koyck lag, cor-
rected for autocorrelation.
Constant -0.011 (-2.8)
Risk Premium 0.29 (2.7)




The risk premium is still significant at the 5-
percent level and still has the correct sign. How-
ever, the steady-state value of its coefficient is
[1/(1 0.81)] (0.29) =1.5, which is much larger
than the coefficient under the first expectations
assumption.
The fact that the risk premium is significant in
both sets ofregressions suggests that Canadian-
U.S. yield spreads do incorporate adjustments
for risk, caused by interest-rate and exchange-
rate variability. But without a more rigorous
approach to modeling exchange-rate expecta-
tions, the magnitude of those adjustments is
difficult to gauge.
V. Summary and Conclusions
The major theme of this article has been the
difference in international yield spreads on long-
term bonds when investors are averse to risk, as
opposed to when they ignore risk. In the latter
case, yield spreads merely reflect expected
exchange-rate movements. In the former, they
also reflect adjustments for the combined effects
of interest-rate risk and exchange-rate risk.
Why would an investor simultaneously hold
both domesticand foreign long bondswhen their
expected yields (adjusted for anticipated
exchange-rate changes) are not equal? The ex-
planation can be found in the concept of"port-
folio balance." Both bonds are subject to
interest-rate risk; the foreign bond is subject to
exchange-rate risk as well. By holding a diversi-
fied portfolio which includes both of them, an
investor is generally able to reduce the fluctua-
tions in his total earnings. A risk-averse investor
will therefore find it worthwhile to hold some
portion ofhis wealthin theform ofthe bond with
the lower expected yield, in order to reap the
gains from diversification.
Empirical evidence based on the behavior of
Canadian-U.S. interest-rate differentials sup-
ports the hypothesis that investors are risk-
averse. As a result, yield spreads between coun-
tries may be a poor guide to the market's
expectations about future exchange rate move-
ments. At the very least, those yield spreads may
give a false impression about thesizeofexpected
movements. Atworst, iftherisk premium is large
enough, they may even give a wrong signal
regarding the sign of such movements.
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